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Abstract
This paper is centered around the design of a thread-
and memory-safe language, primarily for the compilation
of application-specific services for extensible operating sys-
tems. We describe various issues that have influenced the
design of our language, called Cuckoo, that guarantees
safety of programs with potentially asynchronous flows of
control. Comparisons are drawn between Cuckoo and re-
lated software safety techniques, including Cyclone and
software-based fault isolation (SFI), and performance re-
sults suggest our prototype compiler is capable of gener-
ating safe code that executes with low runtime overheads,
even without potential code optimizations. Compared to
Cyclone, Cuckoo is able to safely guard accesses to mem-
ory when programs are multithreaded. Similarly, Cuckoo
is capable of enforcing memory safety in situations that are
potentially troublesome for techniques such as SFI.
1 Introduction
In recent times, there has been a trend to employ
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) systems for diverse appli-
cations having specific needs (e.g., in terms of real-time re-
quirements). For this reason, extensible systems have been
proposed [1, 13, 14], to allow the underlying system to be
customized with services that are tailored to individual ap-
plication demands. However, various techniques to enforce
system safety have proven necessary, to prevent untrusted
users from deploying potentially dangerous extension code
in traditionally trusted protection domains such as the ker-
nel. Such techniques include sandboxing [15, 12, 13], type-
safe languages [5, 2, 10], proof-carrying codes [8], and
hardware-support [3, 7]. While hardware approaches are
generally less expensive than software safety techniques,
they require features such as paging and segmentation that
are not common to all architectures, or may be too coarse-
grained for memory protection of small objects. In con-
trast, software techniques have largely focused on memory
protection without considering other needs of service ex-
tensions (e.g., safe management of asynchronous threads
of control, fine-grained memory allocation, and predictable
real-time performance).
This paper, therefore, focuses on a novel language that
provides memory safety, while ensuring controlled access
to code and data in the presence of asynchronous threads of
control. As with languages such as Cyclone [5], our lan-
guage called “Cuckoo” is both syntactically and semanti-
cally similar to C. This has the advantage that legacy code
can easily be translated, and new programs my be written in
a manner familiar to many existing application and system
developers.
The significant contributions of this paper include a de-
scription of the key design issues of Cuckoo with attention
given to issues not easily supported by other software safety
techniques. Specifically, we focus on the ability to: (1) en-
sure safe access to memory even when code may be exe-
cuted by multiple threads, (2) provide fine-grained control
over memory usage (not easily achieved by languages such
as Java), and (3) achieve run-time performance close to that
of untrusted C binaries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
focuses on the design issues of Cuckoo with respect to
memory safety, while thread safety issues are discussed in
Section 3. Section 4 describes the performance of our pro-
totype Cuckoo compiler for a series of applications, some
of which employ multiple threads. For applications that are
single-threaded, we compare the performance of Cuckoo to
other approaches including Cyclone, software-based fault
isolation [12] and C. Related work is described in Section 5
while conclusions and future work are covered in Section 6.
2 Memory safety
We describe a program as memory safe if it fulfills the
following two conditions:
• It cannot write to nor read from any memory location
which was not reserved for its use by the trusted run-
time system, and
• It cannot jump to any location which does not contain
trusted code (where trusted code is either code which
was generated by a trusted compiler, or part of the
trusted runtime).
These conditions are very similar to traditional definitions
of memory safety (such as those assumed by [4]), except for
their dependence on a trusted runtime system. We claim that
a correct compiler for the language we describe, in combi-
nation with such a trusted runtime, will produce only mem-
ory safe programs. In the remainder of this section we dis-
cuss various challenges that have affected the design of our
memory safe language, called Cuckoo.
Dynamic memory allocation. For dynamic memory allo-
cation, we do not allow malloc-style operations. Instead,
we introduce the C++-style new operator to allocate mem-
ory large enough for an object of a specific type. The return
value will be a pointer to an object of the specified type.
The new operator works as in K&R C but declares a partic-
ular object space on the heap to be available for reallocation
for objects of either: (1) the same type, or (2) compatible
types with the same or smaller storage requirements. Ob-
serve that (2) implies a matching delete operator may al-
low heap memory to be reassigned from one harmless type
to another, thereby avoiding unnecessary growth in heap us-
age. Further details about harmless types are described in
the Appendix. At this point the reader should simply note
these semantics do not guard against incorrect program be-
havior but will ensure memory and type safety.
Stack safety. Stack safety concerns the potential problem
arising from dereferencing pointers to automatic variables
after returning from the function in which they were al-
located. Additionally, overflow errors arise when a stack
extends into a region beyond some defined limit. Nor-
mally, stack overruns are detected by the underlying hard-
ware (e.g., using page-based virtual memory). However,
a key design issue of Cuckoo is to detect stack overflow
within memory regions where hardware protection is not
available. One such example includes support for multiple
thread stacks within a super-page (e.g., 4MB memory area)
on a platform such as the Intel x86 [15, 11].
The stack overrun problem is, in general, undecidable.
Hence, the Cuckoo approach involves runtime checks to
throw an exception if stack overflow occurs. Unlike other
memory-safe languages, such as Cyclone, which compile
source code to another high-level language, Cuckoo gen-
erates native machine code. This enables Cuckoo to accu-
rately track stack usage, based upon its knowledge of reg-
ister versus stack allocation at code generation time. In
Cyclone runtime checks for stack overruns are not possi-
ble, because secondary compilation (e.g., using gcc) on the
compiler’s output may use stack space in an unknown way.
In some cases, Cuckoo allows compile-time verification
of stack usage when the maximum stack depth can be deter-
mined. In general, we have the potential to push up the call
stack run-time checks to determine stack overruns, to points
where all ensuing control-flow’s stack usage can be verified,
thereby reducing the number of runtime checks necessary.
Note, however, that conditional branches that may affect
stack usage ideally require runtime stack checks to avoid
prematurely throwing stack overflow exceptions when in
fact there is enough space available.
extern a(...) { // suppose stack
// usage is small
// in this block
char a_local[256];
if (...)
b();
}
static b (...) { // again, have
// minimal stack usage
if (...)
c();
}
static c() {
char c_local[65536]; // stack-allocate
// lots of memory
...
}
Figure 1. Example to illustrate where stack
checks must be performed
Further details can be found in the example shown in
Figure 1. In this figure there is a limit on how far up the
call stack we can place runtime checks for stack overflows.
For example, placing a runtime check before the conditional
(if statement) in function b may incorrectly presume the fol-
lowing code will use as much as 64KB of stack space (given
function c() is called) but this may not be the case, depend-
ing on the value of the conditional expression. Also, be-
cause function a() is an extern it must perform its own stack
checking as it is generally unknown which control path has
invoked function a(). In contrast, because functions b() and
c() are static, it is possible to track where they are called
from, thereby reducing runtime stack overflow checks to
locations in calling functions, rather than the static func-
tions themselves. However, to deal with general and mutual
recursion, we must perform a runtime stack check every it-
eration, as it is usually undecidable how many times the
function will be invoked.
Pointers and array bounds checks. Cuckoo performs ar-
ray bounds checks at compile-time for cases where the array
size and index are both compile-time constants. All other
cases involve runtime bounds checks. Our prototype imple-
mentation stores the array size in a memory location imme-
diately preceding the first element of each dimension of the
array stored in row major format. This ensures that the size
of an array is always known at runtime. By comparison, in
C, it may be the case that an array is used when its size is
unknown. This has impact on the way Cuckoo treats arrays.
Specifically, the name of an array in Cuckoo is a pointer to
an array of some known number of objects of a given type,
whereas in C an array name is a pointer to the first object
in the array. This means that, whereas in C a variable of
type “array of T” can be used interchangeably with a type
“pointer to T”, in Cuckoo the same variable can be used
interchangeably with a “pointer to an array of T”. This is
discussed further in the Appendix with respect to “Pointer
Generation”. Figure 2 shows the similarities and differences
between C and Cuckoo for array types.
In Cuckoo, any pointer object, P , is either NULL or
points to storage which can be safely treated as having a
type of P , while P exists. In order to make automatic
pointer validity tracking easier, Cuckoo differs from C with
respect to the lifetime of local variables. In Cuckoo, the
lifetime of locals is extended from the scope of a block to
the scope of a function. With respect to stack safety dis-
cussed earlier, this approach also has the advantage that
stack checks are simplified; only one check at the begin-
ning of a function is necessary, to establish space for all
automatic variables encountered in that function.
Dangling pointers. Dangling pointers are problematic in
two situations: (1) dereferencing pointers to deallocated
heap memory, and (2) dereferencing pointers into stack
space on return from a function. In the latter case, the
Cuckoo type system prevents assignment of an automatic
object address, α, to a pointer whose lifetime is longer than
α (see Appendix, section A7.17).
Given the above similarities and differences between C
and Cuckoo, Figure 3 compares the two languages in terms
of legal casts. Further information can be found in the Ap-
pendix under “Pointers and Integers”.
Exception handling. Currently all runtime exceptions trap
to a default handler. A simple extension to this is to al-
low a generic SIGUSR signal to be raised, thereby allow-
ing application-code to customize the exception handling
for specific cases. In future work, we plan to extend Cuckoo
with exception-handling capabilities similar to those in C++
and Java.
Type homogeneity of dynamically allocated memory ob-
jects. As with the LLVM approach [4] to deal with pool-
based dynamic memory allocation, Cuckoo allows heap
memory to be reallocated (after a delete) to objects of
compatible type. By “compatible” we mean that any aliases
created by such an allocation cannot violate type-safety
(thereby leading to potential memory protection problems).
For example, Figure 4 shows how a freed heap memory area
is reallocated to an object of a different type, thereby allow-
ing an arbitrary memory location to be dereferenced. In
Cuckoo, the statement q=new(char *) is guaranteed to
return an address on the heap that is not incompatible with
a ‘char *’, so it is impossible for the return value to be the
same as previously assigned to p.
3 Thread safety
Many system services rely on execution models which
are considerably more complicated than the traditional
model of a single synchronous thread of control. The ex-
ecution of concurrent threads and the processing of asyn-
chronous signals and kernel upcalls mean that correctness
guarantees are significantly more difficult to achieve. We
do not (and cannot) prove the correctness of user code with
respect to concurrency, but it is vital to ensure that the
memory safety checks described in the previous section still
hold.
We cope with null pointer checks by evaluating all
pointer values in registers, so that the value checked is iden-
tical to the value dereferenced. Even if the code does not ex-
ecute atomically, the register is guaranteed to be restored, so
there cannot be a null pointer dereference. This does mean
that we might dereference a pointer whose value is stale,
as opposed to a dangling pointer. Observe that Cuckoo im-
poses no restrictions on pointer aliases, and non-atomic ma-
nipulation of pointers may lead to violations in program cor-
rectness but, nonetheless, will not violate memory safety as
defined in Section 2.
The key issue here is that languages such as Cyclone
support the use of fat pointers (i.e., pointers that maintain
size information about the object they reference), but con-
current updates to such pointers can lead to race conditions
and, hence, out-of-bounds memory accesses. In Cyclone,
updates to pointer addresses are not made atomically with
respect to changes (and checks) on the corresponding size
field. For example, a fat pointer p shared by two threads
may initially refer to an array a[20] and later be updated to
refer to a different array, b[10]. While the pointer may refer
to the address of b its size field may be inconsistent, hav-
ing the old value of 20, thereby enabling a potential array
char a[5];
char c1 = *a; // valid in C but not Cuckoo
char c2 = a[0]; // valid in Cuckoo, s.t. c2 is the same as c1 in C
char c3 = (*a)[0]; // also valid in Cuckoo: c3 is the same as c2
Figure 2. Array types in C versus Cuckoo
struct foo {
int a[5];
char *s;
}
struct foo *p;
int x = *((int *)p); // legal in C but not in Cuckoo...
int y = *((int (*)[5])p); // however, this is illegal in Cuckoo,
// since we cannot assign an array to an int, but...
int z = ((int (*)[5]p)[0]; // is legal in Cuckoo, as this assigns z
// the first element of an array
Figure 3. Example casts in C and Cuckoo
int *p;
char **q;
p = new(int); // heap-allocate an integer
...
delete(p); // release memory referenced by p
q = new(char *); // reuse heap memory freed at address p with
// incompatible typed object.
*p = 123; // after freeing p, continue to assign values to its
// heap memory area
**q = 45; // This results in writing the value 45 in address 123,
// potentially violating memory safety
Figure 4. Reallocation of freed heap memory
overflow on b. This situation is not possible with Cuckoo.
Moreover, array bounds checks (as stated earlier) are trivial
given that size information is embedded in the array objects
themselves, rather than carried along with pointers that ref-
erence them.
4 Experimental Results
The implementation details of Cuckoo are outside the
scope of this paper. Currently, we have a version of the
compiler that leverages the gcc preprocessor, linker and
assembler. After preprocessing a source file, the cuckoo
compiler performs compile-time checks on types, lifetimes
of objects referenced by pointers, and certain array bound
and NULL pointer checks, where the values are compile-
time constants. Run-time checks are inserted for array and
pointer accesses, where array indices cannot be determined
within bounds at compile time, and pointers cannot be guar-
anteed valid. By valid we mean that a pointer is non-NULL
and references an object of compatible type (considering
type information includes the lifetime of objects). Observe
that determining whether or not a pointer references a com-
patible type does not require run-time checks.
To date, we have a Cuckoo compiler that generates tar-
get assembly code for the 80386 architecture. While we
currently use the gnu linker, it is quite possible for Cuckoo
source files to be compiled and linked with untrusted ob-
jects, whose symbols may be referenced from Cuckoo code.
While typing rules must be adhered in Cuckoo code that ref-
erences external symbols in untrusted code, there is no guar-
antee of safety within the body of an external object. Future
work includes the development of a trusted linker, which
checks type-safety across separately compiled objects and
detects attempts to link with untrusted code. Right now,
Cyclone suffers from these same limitations.
Table 1 shows the performance of our prototype (com-
Compiler Time (user) Time (system) Size (code) Size (data) Size (BSS)
SUBSET-SUM
Cuckoo 30.96 n/a 2377 288 152
gcc -O2 17.86 n/a 1833 280 192
gcc 24.75 n/a 1945 280 192
PRODUCER-CONSUMER
Cuckoo 2.50 5.13 2527 308 428
gcc -O2 2.46 5.10 2001 300 480
gcc 2.50 5.14 2093 300 480
FIND-PRIMES
Cuckoo 10.17 n/a 1301 260 10016
Optimized Cuckoo 6.78 n/a 1285 260 10016
gcc 9.56 n/a 874 252 10032
gcc -O2 3.57 n/a 814 252 10032
Cyclone 12.43 n/a 91721 3340 59996
Cyclone -O2 5.51 n/a 91669 3340 59996
Cyclone -noregions -nogc 12.43 n/a 51619 2020 11140
Cyclone -noregions -nogc -O2 5.50 n/a 51567 2020 11140
SFI 10.79 n/a 970 252 10032
SFI -O2 4.31 n/a 858 252 10032
SFI protection 11.10 n/a 1058 252 10032
SFI protection -O2 4.32 n/a 870 252 10032
Table 1. Comparison of execution time and storage requirements
pared to gcc 3.2.2 and Cyclone 0.7 running on a 2.8 GHz
Pentium 4 CPU). The first benchmark, SUBSET-SUM,
is a naive parallel solution to the well-known (and NP-
complete) decision problem of whether a given set of inte-
gers contains a subset which sums to zero. The results listed
indicate the times (in seconds) and program size (in bytes)
required to compute the SUBSET-SUM decision for a set
of 27 random integers (the set was kept identical for each
run and the numbers were in the range [−106,+106]), us-
ing 4 threads. The PRODUCER-CONSUMER test consists
of one producer thread and one consumer thread, sharing a
single memory buffer which is filled by the producer and
emptied by the consumer.
The FIND-PRIMES benchmark uses a single-threaded
implementation of the Sieve of Eratosthenes algorithm to
compute a list of prime numbers (in our case, 105 iterations
of the algorithm finding all primes below 104). Note that
an “Optimized Cuckoo” entry has been added to this last
result, which simulates the performance of a slightly more
sophisticated compiler which honors the register key-
word by keeping certain variables in CPU registers instead
of main memory. Since our prototype compiler does not
yet implement this optimization, the “Optimized Cuckoo”
results were obtained by modifying Cuckoo assembly lan-
guage output by hand to keep the values of index variables
in the innermost loop in spare registers. The significant im-
provement in runtime from this small change seems to in-
dicate that there is substantial room for improvement if an
optimizing compiler were written for our language. Since
the FIND-PRIMES benchmark is single-threaded, it is also
compatible with the Cyclone 0.7 compiler. We have listed
the results of four tests with Cyclone, with various compiler
options: -O2 invokes the optimizer in the gcc back-end,
and -noregions -nogc disable Cyclone’s region anal-
ysis and garbage collector (which are not required in this
benchmark, as no runtime dynamic memory allocation is
performed).
Lastly, the SFI results show the performance of software-
based fault isolation [12], that inserts run-time checks on
jumps and stores to memory addresses unknown at compile-
time (e.g., those stored in registers). Since no SFI imple-
mentation exists for the x86 architecture, these benchmarks
were compiled with gcc 3.2.2 and the assembly output of
the compiler was modified by hand to insert the SFI-style
address bound restrictions. The compiler’s register alloca-
tions were modified by hand where necessary to preserve
a sufficient number of reserved registers, and then extra in-
structions were added to memory accesses according to the
SFI “address sandboxing” procedure. The -O2 rows are
the results when the original compiler was gcc -O2, and
the other two rows were compiled with plain gcc. The
“protection” rows implement full protection (by modifying
both memory read and write operations), while the other
two rows implement fault isolation only (where writes are
sandboxed but no attempt is made to prevent illegal reads).
The results using SFI are slightly better than with
Cuckoo. We conjecture the performance with SFI is partly
due memory access time being the bottleneck, as opposed to
CPU speed. The deep pipelining allows SFI memory checks
to be performed (to some degree) in parallel with memory
loads and stores. However, it should be noted that the hand-
modifications used in the SFI tests do not deal with all safety
issues, such as potential jumps to misaligned addresses in
code segments, or preventing constant data within code seg-
ments from being executed. In contrast, Cuckoo prevents
pointer arithmetic and aliasing of pointers to incompatible
types (e.g., aliasing to different members of unions). This
eliminates the potential unsolved problems with SFI. Also
observe that while SFI performs well for this example, it is
quite possible that for many register-intensive applications,
an architecture which is register-limited (e.g., the x86) may
prove problematic. We plan to study more application ex-
amples in the future.
For the two CPU-intensive benchmarks (SUBSET-SUM
and FIND-PRIMES), it appears that Cuckoo is on the order
of 15% more expensive (in time and space) than unopti-
mized gcc. Some of this cost can be attributed to array
bound and null pointer checks, which must be performed
at runtime, and therefore contribute to both the execution
time and code size, and part of the expense can be blamed
on poor compiler implementation, since so far very little ef-
fort has been spent attempting to make our prototype com-
piler generate efficient code. However, note that in the
second (PRODUCER-CONSUMER) benchmark, which is
data- rather than CPU-intensive, the execution time for
the Cuckoo code is comparable to that produced by gcc.
Therefore, while we admit that for CPU-intensive or gen-
eral purpose code we cannot realistically expect a Cuckoo
compiler to match the efficiency of C, we hope that for the
type of code in our target domain (low-level, data-intensive
system services), the overheads we require will be minimal,
and, depending on the environment, worth sacrificing for
the safety guarantees we can provide.
To finish this section, we compared Cuckoo versus gcc
for a parallel implementation of the subset-sum problem on
a 4x2.2GHz AMD Opteron machine. Table 2 shows the
real-time results. As expected, gcc -O2 is the fastest but
Cuckoo is slightly slower than unoptimized gcc. The dif-
ference is performance is arguably outweighed by the ben-
efits of extra safety checks being performed by the com-
piler and, as stated earlier, there is room for improvement
in the Cuckoo compiler’s generated code. Notwithstanding,
we believe this is evidence that a type-safe language can
efficiently generate safe code with concurrent execution re-
quirements.
Compiler Parallel time (real)
Cuckoo 9.45
gcc -O2 4.59
gcc 7.40
Table 2. Execution times for parallel subset-
sum problem
5 Related work
Table 3 compares Cuckoo to several notable soft-
ware safety techniques. While other approaches include
CCured [9], and Modula-3 [10], we feel characteristics of
these languages are largely captured by those illustrated in
the table. With Cuckoo: (1) there is no need for garbage
collection, (2) correctness is not enforced (only safety), (3)
runtime checks are allowed, (4) strict compatibility with C
is sacrificed for ease of enforcing safety checks, and (5)
thread safety is integral to the design of the language. Of
the other related works, no other language or compiler pro-
vides this set of characteristics, which we feel is important
for our target domain, namely, extensible system services.
For example, Cyclone does not ensure multithreaded mem-
ory safety, and although Java provides this, it requires re-
stricted memory management and corresponding garbage
collection.
Of the techniques listed in Table 3, SFI appears to have
the most similarities. However, SFI provides only partial
memory safety compared to Cuckoo. To illustrate this, Fig-
ure 5 shows a situation that SFI cannot easily detect. In this
example, there is a jump to an address that is 10 bytes from
the beginning of function bad and this may not be the start
of the instruction. Observe that this problem only exists on
CISC architectures, that allow for variable-length instruc-
tions. SFI was originally designed for RISC architectures
that have fixed-length instructions aligned on word bound-
aries.
Finally, while there has been work on purely static anal-
ysis of program safety [4], such approaches are made more
complicated when there are asynchronous execution paths,
and have thus far applied control-flow analysis techniques
to programs with single threads of execution.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper presents an overview of the Cuckoo com-
piler and its design considerations with respect to support-
ing thread and memory safe programs. The specific ap-
plication domain of this compiler is in support of system
service extensions, where asynchronous control-flow (e.g.,
using threads and signals) is commonplace. Our insights
System C Cyclone Java SFI Cuckoo
Efficient memory use    
Memory safe   partially 
Stack overflow checking   
Multithreaded memory safety   
Can operate without garbage
collection
   
Unrestricted allocation without
garbage collection
  
Table 3. Features offered by various languages and approaches
static void bad( void ) {
volatile int x = 0x0BADC0DE;
}
extern int main( void ) {
union foo {
char *data;
void ( *code )( void );
} bar;
bar.code = bad;
bar.data += 10; // whatever the offset is
// to 0x0BADC0DE
bar.code();
return 0;
}
Figure 5. Example jump to a potentially un-
aligned address
gained from research on extensible operating systems [14]
using type-safe languages such as Cyclone led us to believe
that multithreaded memory safety was a key issue in ex-
tension code. Results show that Cuckoo provides program
safety for both single- and multi-threaded applications with
relatively low runtime overheads compared to comparable
code compiled using unsafe C compilers, such as gcc.
Results show that, while techniques such as SFI have the
potential to perform with low runtime overheads, it is ar-
guably difficult to check for references to misaligned ad-
dresses and jumps to instructions embedded in data con-
stants within program text segments. Cuckoo has the ability
to check for these issues, using its typing rules at compile
time.
Future work involves studying the costs of dynamic
memory allocation, and its safe usage in the presence of
asynchronous control-flow. Specifically, dynamic memory
allocation within a signal handler requires mutually exclu-
sive access to heap data structures, that maintain pools of
free and allocated memory. Using traditional locking mech-
anisms to allocate and update the state of heap memory can
potentially lead to deadlocks between signal handlers and a
program’s main thread of control holding a lock at the time
a signal handler is invoked.
A Language Definition
The Cuckoo language is exactly the same as C as de-
fined in the 2nd edition of K&R [6] Appendix A, with some
notable exceptions. Below, we outline the differences be-
tween Cuckoo and C, labelling each of the following sub-
sections with the corresponding appendix labels in the K&R
book [6]:
A4.1 Storage Class
Automatic objects are local to a function, not to a block;
they retain their values across exit from and reentry to
blocks, and are not discarded until exit from the function.
The main reason for this change is to ensure that local stor-
age is never deallocated within a function (which prevents
dangling pointers when one local points to another). Sec-
ondary benefits are that harmful objects (those which require
initialized values for safety) need only be initialized once per
function instead of once per allocation, and that stack growth
within a function is reduced or eliminated, which reduces
stack space checking overhead.
A4.5 Harmless Types (new section)
A type is “harmless” if it is a numeric (integral or float-
ing) or void type, or if it is a structure or union which con-
tains only harmless members.
Conversely, “harmful” types are arrays, pointers, and any
structure or union which (recursively) contains an array or
pointer. The distinction between these two classes of types
becomes important because uninitialized data or aliases be-
tween harmless types can never violate memory safety, and is
therefore permissible in many cases for efficiency.
A5. Objects and Lvalues
An lvalue also has a storage class; the permissible stor-
age classes for lvalues are the two storage classes defined
for objects (automatic and static) and also the class “un-
known”. The discussion of each lvalue operator specifies
which storage classes are permissible and which storage
class is yielded. Expressions which are not lvalues do not
have storage classes defined (except that expressions of ar-
ray type do have storage classes, even though array types
are not lvalues).
Storage classes for lvalues are important because they allow us
to detect potential references to deallocated automatic objects
at compile time; see section A7.17.
A6.6 Pointers and Integers
Addition and subtraction expressions including pointer
operands are prohibited.
K&R C allows addition and subtraction only on pointers to
objects in arrays; however, statically determining that a given
pointer points to an array object is undecidable. We therefore
forbid the practice. Similar results can be achieved in cases
where the array object itself is known, by taking the address
of an indexed array element.
Casts to or from pointers to functions are prohibited.
This is required to ensure that the types of arguments match
the types of function parameters when calling through func-
tion pointers.
Casts of other pointers are permitted only when casting:
(1) to a numeric or void type, (2) to a pointer to void, (3)
from a pointer to a harmless type to a pointer of harmless
type no larger than the original, or (4) from a “pointer to
struct S” to a “pointer to T ”, where T is the type of the
first member of struct S.
The result of case (1) is implementation-dependent (as in
K&R C) but harmless. Case (2) is safe, because pointers to
void may never be dereferenced, nor cast to any type which
can be dereferenced. Case (3) can violate type safety only
for harmless types, which are known not to violate memory
safety. Case (4) is safe, being identical to K&R C as described
in Appendix 8.3 (although it effectively forces the compiler
to place the first member of a struct at the address of the
struct).
Casts from integral types to pointers are prohibited, ex-
cept that the constant zero may be cast to any pointer type
to obtain a null pointer.
When combined with the above restrictions, this limits the val-
ues that a pointer may hold to: (1) the null pointer, (2) the ad-
dress of a compatible object obtained with the & operator, or
(3) a value copied from a compatible pointer. All three cases
are safe.
All pointers belong to one of two types: static pointers
or automatic pointers. (The name refers to properties of
objects the pointer may point to; it is unrelated to the storage
class of the pointer itself.)
This requirement allows us to determine the storage class of
the lvalue obtained when the pointer is dereferenced.
Casts from automatic pointers to static pointers are pro-
hibited.
We must enforce the invariant that static pointers point only to
objects with static storage class (see section A7.17).
A6.8 Pointers to Void
Pointers to void may not be assigned to any other pointer
nor cast to any other pointer type, although they are permit-
ted in pointer equality comparisons.
A7.1 Pointer Generation
The value of an array expression is a pointer to the array,
not a pointer to the first element of the array. If the storage
class of “array of T ” is static, then the type of the array
expression is “static pointer to array of T ”, otherwise it is
“automatic pointer to array of T ”.
A7.2 Primary Expressions
An identifier is an lvalue if it refers to an object and its
type is arithmetic, structure, union or pointer; the lvalue
storage class is the same as the object storage class.
The storage class of string literals is static.
The presence of parentheses does not affect the storage
class of an expression.
A7.3.1 Array References
The first expression in an array reference must be of type
pointer to array of type T , and the second must be integral.
(Note that array subscripting is no longer a commutative op-
eration.)
The type of the result is T , and is an lvalue if type T
is an arithmetic type, or a structure, union or pointer. The
storage class of an array reference of type “static pointer to
array” is static; the storage class of all other array references
is unknown.
A7.3.2 Function Calls
Calls to undeclared functions are prohibited.
This is because there is no way to check for type compatibil-
ity between arguments and function parameters for functions
without prototypes.
A7.3.3 Structure References
The storage class of all structure and union member ref-
erences is the same as the storage class of the structure or
union expression.
A7.4.2 Address Operator
When applied to an object with static storage class, the
‘&’ operator yields a static pointer; otherwise it yields an
automatic pointer.
A7.4.3 Indirection Operator
When applied to an expression of type “static pointer to
T ”, the storage class of the ‘*’ operator is static; otherwise
the storage class is unknown.
A7.7 Additive Operators
Additive operations on pointers are prohibited.
See section A6.6.
A7.9 Relational Operators
Relational operations on pointers are prohibited.
A7.10 Equality Operators
Storage class is irrelevant when applying equality oper-
ators to pointers; that is, an automatic pointer to object O is
considered equal to a static pointer to object O.
A7.16 Conditional Operator
If one of the second and third operands of the condi-
tional operator is an automatic pointer and the other is a
static pointer, then the result is an automatic pointer.
A7.17 Assignment Expressions
It is illegal to assign a automatic pointer to a static
pointer.
If the left hand side of an assignment expression has stor-
age class unknown, or static, and is not a harmless type, then
the right hand side may not have automatic pointer type, nor
be an aggregate type which (recursively) contains any auto-
matic pointer type.
These rules are fundamental in ruling out dangling pointers to
automatic storage. Together, they enforce the invariant that no
static object may hold the address of an automatic object.
A7.19 Constant Expressions
Initializers must evaluate either to a constant or to the
address of a previously declared external or static object.
K&R C allows initializers to evaluate to the address of an ob-
ject plus or minus a constant, but in the general case such an
initializer would violate type safety.
A8.3 Structure and Union Declarations
All members of unions must be of harmless type.
Incomplete types are permissible, but any type which is
used must be completely defined in the same translation
unit.
A8.5 Declarators
The “pointer” syntax for declarators is extended to:
pointer:
* type-qualifier-listopt
* type-qualifier-listopt pointer
@ type-qualifier-listopt
@ type-qualifier-listopt pointer
Note that this is the only difference in syntax between K&R C
and Cuckoo.
A8.6.1 Pointer Declarators
A pointer declarator with ‘*’ declares an automatic
pointer; a declarator with ‘@’ declares a static pointer.
A8.6.3 Function Declarators
Old-style function declarations are prohibited. If no pa-
rameter type list appears in a function declaration, it is in-
terpreted as an explicit declaration that a function accepts
no parameters.
Variadic functions are prohibited.
This is because we cannot check the types of arguments
against function parameters in variadic functions.
The types of parameters that are arrays are altered to au-
tomatic pointers to arrays.
For example, the following declarations are equivalent:
int myfunc( int arrayparam[] );
int myfunc( int (*arrayparam)[]
);
To explicitly declare a static pointer to an array, the following
is allowed:
int myfunc( int (@arrayparam)[]
);
A8.7 Initialization
Automatic pointer objects which are not explicitly ini-
tialized are initialized to the same value that a static object
of the same type would receive. Pointer members of ag-
gregate objects are likewise initialized. This initialization
occurs each time the enclosing function is called.
Of course, an optimizing compiler would still be free to elide
the implicit initialization if it could determine that the pointer
is always initialized before being accessed.
A9.6 Jump Statements
It is illegal to return an expression of automatic pointer
type.
This restriction makes sure that the address of an automatic
object is never accessible outside the function it is declared
in (or that function’s children): it cannot be returned (by this
rule); it cannot be stored in a static object (see section A7.17);
and it cannot be stored in an automatic object in a calling
function’s context through a pointer parameter (since the stor-
age class of such an lvalue would be “unknown”; see section
A7.4.3).
In functions returning a harmful type, flowing off the end
of a function and return statements without expressions are
prohibited.
A10.2 External Declarations
Incomplete array types are forbidden in external declara-
tions.
References
[1] B. N. Bershad, S. Savage, P. Pardyak, E. G. Sirer, M. Fi-
uczynski, and B. E. Chambers. Extensibility, safety, and
performance in the SPIN operating system. In Proceedings
of the 15th ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Princi-
ples, pages 267–284, Copper Mountain, Colorado, Decem-
ber 1995.
[2] L. Carnahan and M. Ruark. Requirements for real-
time extensions for the Java platform, September 1999.
http://www.itl.nist.gov/div897/ctg/real-time/rtj-final-
draft.pdf.
[3] T. Chiueh, G. Venkitachalam, and P. Pradhan. Integrating
segmentation and paging protection for safe, efficient and
transparent software extensions. In Symposium on Operat-
ing Systems Principles, pages 140–153, 1999.
[4] D. Dhurjati, S. Kowshik, V. Adve, and C. Lattner. Mem-
ory safety without runtime checks or garbage collection. In
Proc. Languages, Compilers and Tools for Embedded Sys-
tems 2003, San Diego, CA, June 2003.
[5] T. Jim, G. Morrisett, D. Grossman, M. Hicks, J. Cheney, and
Y. Wang. Cyclone: A safe dialect of C. In Proceedings of
the USENIX Annual Technical Conference, pages 275–288,
Monterey, CA, June 2002.
[6] B. W. Kernighan and D. M. Ritchie. The C Programming
Language Second Edition. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1988.
[7] J. Liedtke. On micro-kernel construction. In Proceedings of
the 15th ACM Symposium on Operating System Principles.
ACM, December 1995.
[8] G. C. Necula and P. Lee. Safe kernel extensions without run-
time checking. In 2nd Symposium on Operating Systems De-
sign and Implementation (OSDI ’96), October 28–31, 1996.
Seattle, WA, pages 229–243, Berkeley, CA, USA, 1996.
[9] G. C. Necula, S. McPeak, and W. Weimer. Ccured: Type-
safe retrofitting of legacy code. In Proceedings of the Prin-
ciples of Programming Languages. ACM, 2002.
[10] G. Nelson. Systems Programming with Modula-3. Prentice
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1991.
[11] X. Qi, G. Parmer, and R. West. An efficient end-host archi-
tecture for cluster communication services. In Proceedings
of the IEEE International Conference on Cluster Computing
(Cluster ’04), September 2004.
[12] T. A. R. Wahbe, S. Lucco and S. Graham. Software-based
fault isolation. In Proceedings of the 14th SOSP, Asheville,
NC, USA, December 1993.
[13] M. I. Seltzer, Y. Endo, C. Small, and K. A. Smith. Deal-
ing with disaster: Surviving misbehaved kernel extensions.
In Proceedings of the 2nd Symposium on Operating Systems
Design and Implementation, pages 213–227, Seattle, Wash-
ington, 1996.
[14] R. West and J. Gloudon. ‘QoS safe’ kernel extensions for
real-time resource management. In the 14th EuroMicro In-
ternational Conference on Real-Time Systems, June 2002.
[15] R. West and J. Gloudon. User-Level Sandboxing: a safe
and efficient mechanism for extensibility. Technical Report
2003-14, Boston University, 2003. Now revised and submit-
ted for publication.
